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Klaas Tindemans, "The King's Travesty", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique Vol. X no.29 (1997), 115-139: Aristotle's Poetica, as a normative account of tragedy, reveals a remarkable affinity with the process of 'juridification', as guaranteed by legal dogmatics. This shift from tragedy to theory (philosophy) is confronted with the political issues at stake in the hypothetical practice of performance of Attic tragedy in the 5th century B.C., in Athens. After a small case-study of Euripides' Bacchanals - hence the title of this paper - the essay analyzes tragedy as a public experience: its institutional context, the position of the players, and the gaze of the audience. Through this analysis performed tragedy is revealed as a representational political discourse, which problematizes the rupture between the polis (political society) and the cult devoted to the 'real order', i.e. the world of divinities. Aristotle's shift of paradigm provides an answer to the crisis of legitimacy of the polis by introducing theory and dogmatics as the specific 'texture' of legal-political legitimation. In a final paragraph this theme is exemplified with possible analogies in Shakespeare's history plays and in the French 'tragédie classique'. e-mail: k.tindemans@kub.nl

Jarkko Tontti, "Law, Tradition and Interpretation", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique X/31 (1998), 25-38: The paper seeks to construct answers to the ontological and epistemological problems of legal philosophy from the basis of continental hermeneutics as it has been developed by Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. First it is argued that the ontological status of law is constituted by a dialectical interplay of tradition and interpretation. The scope of hermeneutics is widened from the interpretation of legal texts (legal sources) to the interpretation of the whole tradition of law, including e.g. practical legal work. The tradition of law is an on-going process of conflicting interpretations, where different interpreters (courts, the legislator, advocates, scholars) compete to get through their views. Secondly it is suggested that the epistemology of law must start from a reconsideration of the Is-Ought distinction: every proposition contains, at least implicitly, a normative demand that the claim ought to be accepted by others. A correct proposition about law has two requirements: it must be in coherence with the tradition and answer the present interpretative question adequately. An adequate decision results when the tradition of law enters into a dialectical relationship with creative and critical interpretation, which guarantees dynamism and the change of the tradition. Tradition only gives the framework or the context in which every interpretative question of law must be answered. There are no non-contextual criteria to distinguish correct interpretations from incorrect ones. e-mail: Jarkko.Tontti@Helsinki.fi

John C.W. Touchie, "Jackson on the "Decisions" Underlying the Application of Rules", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique Vol. X no.30 (1997), 317-335: This paper argues that Bernard Jackson's discussion of the application of "pure" propositional logic is fundamentally flawed. It examines the nature of the "decisions" that Jackson claims are a necessary concomitant of factual determinations of the predicate, and argues that if Jackson's analysis is correct, then contrary to Jackson's assertions, these "decisions" must also be made within the sphere of "pure" propositional logic. It further argues that Jackson's seemingly unobjectionable claims concerning the "decisions" that have to be made when applying rules have substantial, but frequently overlooked, implications for rule-based conduct governance and the notion of following and applying a rule, one of these being that the question of whether or not there is a "decision" to be made in applying a rule can only be determined by turning to an examination of its content and the environment to which it refers. Finally, a more general argument is made against Jackson's position by relating his claims to discussions of the philosophical notion of intentionality. The paper concludes with the suggestion that Jackson's arguments rest on unjustifiable, though commonly employed, assertions concerning the necessary conditions for intentionality.

Christos Tsaitouridis, "Leviathan - Moby Dick: The Physics of The State", Law and Critique VIII/2 (1997), 223-243: This paper attempts a comparative reading of a political treatise and a novel which share similar textual characteristics and a "mighty theme": the whale, Leviathan and its relationship to man. In Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan and Herman Melville's Moby Dick the title of the book exceeds both the more "literal" subtitle and the text; also it implies a structural bond between the name and the body. The primacy of the body (symbolised by the almighty Leviathan) over the soul and the spirit is the main principle of the authors' dramatic and powerful critique of Metaphysics. The positivities of space and the present are juxtaposed to the eschatology of Christianity. Leviathan also subverts the traditional hierarchy of means and ends in political theory, thus becoming the foundation of a radical critique of representation in law. The leviathanian legality is utterly corporeal and therefore it can be comprehended by the axioms of what we could call Physics of the State, for which law and force are in principle indistinguishable. Hobbes presents the law as an order of means, an exteriority, as his insistence on the "artificiality" of the legal order suggests.

David Turns, "Statutory Construction and "basic public policy" in Foreign Relations: Tax Exemptions for "official agents" of an Unrecognised State in the United Kingdom", The Liverpool Law Review XX/2 (1998), 253-271: This article deals with the status of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for certain purposes in the municipal law of the United Kingdom. The TRNC poses considerable legal problems in that it is an unrecognised entity in international law - such entities have very ill-defined rights under municipal law, as demonstrated by Caglar and Others v. HM Inspector of Taxes (1996), in which Turkish Cypriot agents in London claimed exemption from income tax on the grounds that they were entitled to the diplomatic immunities normally accorded to representatives of foreign States. The particular case of Cyprus entails complicated considerations of international treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party in conjunction with questions of statutory construction of British legislation. The answer to these questions is based on considerations of public policy and foreign relations as much as, if not more than, on considerations of law. These issues in turn require analysis of the concepts of statehood and recognition of States in public international law and their effect in the sphere of municipal law and, in the specific case of Cyprus, the context of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the consequent partition of the island. Email: turns@liverpool.ac.uk

 

 

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