Deborah Charles Publications
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M. I. Festenstein, " Pragmatism and Liberalism: Interpreting Dewey's Political Philosophy", Res Publica 1/2 (1995), 163-182: What is the relationship between the pragmatist tradition of philosophy and political theory? This paper contests both a 'received view' of John Dewey's moral and political philosophy, which emphasises its instrumental character. It examines Dewey's holistic account of the nature of moral theory, his teleological conception of moral agency, and the foundations of his liberal political thought in these two ideas. However, recognition of the centrality of this moral framework furnishes the basis upon which to contest a 'revisionist view' of Dewey, which promotes him as an important advocate of participatory democracy. Internal difficulties in this framework suggest that revisionist promoters must either skate rather superficially over his political philosophy (in this respect joining the proponents of the received view) or offer a substantial reconstruction of his political thought. Dr M. I. Festenstein, Department of Politics, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull HU6 7RX. e-mail: M.I.Festenstein@politics.hull.ac .uk

Eveline T. Feteris, "Recent Developments in Legal Argumentation Theory: Dialectical Approaches to Legal Argumentation", International Journal for the Semiotics of Law VII/20 (1994), 134-153. Click here for extended abstract. e-mail: e.feteris@let.uva.nl

Peter Fitzpatrick, "Relational Power and the Limits of Law", in Law and Power, ed. Tuori, Bankowski and Uusitalo (Liverpool: Deborah Charles Publications, 1997), 85-97: Theories of relational power claim to resolve the divide between law as autonomous and law as dependent - dependent on, say, society. The relation between law and society then becomes one of mutual influence. Yet, with relational theory, there is nothing to stop these entities disappearing in the relation. This chapter seeks to refine relational theory by showing that the `autonomy' of the entities should not be seen as given beforehand. `Autonomy' is, rather, created and sustained in the relation.

Michael Freeman, "Left, Right and Human Rights" (Review of Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, and The Age of Rights), Res Publica III/2 (1997), 213-220: Norberto Bobbio, in two recently translated books, has attempted to defend the continuing value of the concepts of 'left' and 'right' in political analysis, and to explain the implications of the idea of human rights. Bobbio holds that the political left is committed to equality whereas the right is committed to inequality. He differentiates this distinction from that between moderates and extremists. Moderates favour tolerant and democratic methods, whereas extremists prefer militaristic, authoritarian means. Moderates and extremists are found on the left and the right. However, while Bobbio makes some useful distinctions, his analysis of equality lacks refinement, and this failure undermines his attempt to distinguish left and right convincingly. Although Bobbio adopts a position of analytical neutrality, his preference is clearly for the moderate left. In his discussion of human rights, he calls for implementation of existing human-rights standards, but holds that justificatory theories are neither possible nor useful. Once again, his failure to examine the complexities of human-rights philosophy leaves us with a well-intentioned liberal programme, but a blunt justificatory basis for implementing it. e-mail: freema@essex.ac.uk

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